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PSYCHOPHYSICS.
Tms is a comparatively new science, although
-its beginnings can be traced back into the last
eentury. But until comparatively recent years it
,occupied a subordinate position in speculative psy-
chology, and the phenomena constituting its prov-
ince were not assumed to be distinct enough for
separate investigation. At present, however, a
certain class of students are endeavoring, by ex-
periment, to give its method and results that exact-
ness which is supposed to describe the function of
science proper. The province of science has become
more exactly defined in the course of its develop-
ment until the proper criterion of its function is
-that measurement and demonstration of its results
-which takes its theories out of the reach of proba-
bilities and conjecture and establishes them upon
a basis of certainty. Introspective psychology has
either presented unsatisfactory results, or the uni-
versal prepossession for experimental effects has
desired to represent it so, and thereby contrast its
incertainty with the tangible and demonstrable
-products of exact science. However we may ac-
count for it, psychophysics has come in to dispute
the territory of the older psychology, at least in
the person of some of its admirers. It likes to
1speak of purely introspective psychology as out of
date, and as if it were discredited merely because
it is of the past. Innovation and change have
predisposed inquirers to enthusiasm for the new,
perhaps because all the great triumphs of modern
science have been conquests over old views, or
deviations from them; the old has lost its prestige.
Nothing has suffered more from this spirit than
I the old psychology,' as it is called by the admirers
of psychophysics. The latter is taking rapid pos-
session of scientific and philosophic interest, until
students of the older philosophy are beginning to
relax from their devotion, and to despair of retain-
ing the homage which so many ages have paid to
the idol of reflective thought.
Mr. Ribot's recent work on contemporary Ger-
man psychology seeks to maintain and widen this
breach between the two sciences: and we cannot
but regret that itshould be so; for they are really
distinct sciences, running parallel with each other,
and have no more reason tocome into conflict with
each other than physics and chemistry. Their
methods may be different, but are not on that
account contradictory; and the one should not be
made all-absorbing to the prejudice of the other.
We frankly admit, however, that it is no wonder
the scientist, accustomed as he is to experiment
and definite results, feels a sense of dissatisfac-
tion with the study against which psychophys-
ics presents the charge of obscurity. Kantian
and post-Kantian psychology has never been
characterized by perspicuity; and it is a natural
revolt against it that even speculative Germany
seems to have abandoned the popular gods of
philosophy to find a new worship in experiments
and facts quite in contrast with the genius of that
people, disposed in so many particulars to take the
high a priori road to truth, and to project every
thing from consciousness, as it is accused of doing.
Hence there is something of justice in the claim of
psychophysics: it does tend to make its conclusions
intelligible to experience; and that is a very great
gain. But, with these legitimate claims to our
respect, it should not usurp the whole province of
psychological experience, which it does not do,
nor repudiate introspection as a proper source and
method of knowledge, which it is too much dis-
posed to do, forgetful of the fact that in so doing
it really undermines the final test of its own results.
The field of psychophysics is much more limited
than one would at first suspect. Its name might
imply at least a partial combination of physiology
and psychology: but its advocates exclude the
main and distinctive features of both these sciences
from it, and assign it a very limited territory; as
Dr. Wundt affirms, the field ' between inner and
outer experience.' This means that it confines its
investigations to phenomena wbich intermediate
between purely mechanical events and purely
reflective consciousness. Hence, on the one hand,
such phenomena as circulation, assimilation, diges-
tion, and on the other, such as perception, judg-
ment, reasoning, memory, and imagination, are
excluded from the field of its inquiries. Thus it
is limited to the phenomena of sensation, which
constitute the intermediate class spoken of. But
even this class is not considered in its qualitative,
but only its quantitative relations, hence it is still
more limited. These quantitative characteristics
consist of their initensity, psychic constancy, and
reaction time. The last may be included under
that of psychic constants, making two distinct
problems for psychophysical investigation. That
of the psychic constants is the more important of
the two, as it has a bearing upon the speculative
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problems of psychology: it is concerned mostly
with the measurements of time and space, or with
those primitive experiences which determine the
genesis of our empirical conceptions of them.
The quality of sensation is not a subject of ex-
periment, but the characteristic of intensity gives
rise to what is known as Weber's law, which de-
signs to express the relation between stimulus and
sensation in respect qf their quantity. It is
found that sensation does not increase in a direct
ratio with the increase of stimulus: and hence
the law -is formulated to express a geometric ratio
in the increase of stimulus, and an arithmetic
ratio in the increased intensity of sensation; or,
inasmuch as the absolute increase of stimulus is
not always the same to increase sensation, it has
been expressed to indicate that " sensation grows
with equal increments when the excitation grows
with relatively equal increments ;" that is, the
ratio between the quantities of stimulus is always
the same, whatever the absolute quantities may
be. This law is quite accurate within a certain
range, but requires modification as we approach
the maximum and the minimum of sensation.
The ratio bqtween stimuli is not the same for dif-
ferent forms of sensation, but varies within a
large degree, although it still sustains its geomet-
ric relation. This fact, as well as something of
the scientific accuracy claimed for the science,
will be evident in the following table of measure-
ments, giving the ratio between stimuli required
for the several senses. The nunmbers indicate that
any given stimulus must be increased by the
amount of itself expressed by the fraction in order
to produce a perceptible change in sensation.
Nothing has been determined for taste and smell.
For touch-..... ........1-8
For muscular effort. ...................
For temperature .........................1-
Forsound ............................. 1-3
For light ....................... .......1-100
Thus any given object or resistance must be in-
creased by one-third of its force in order to pro-
duce a perceptible increase of sensation; and so
on with the remag senses. But the question
arises, How far do such results give mathemati-
cal accuracy and exactness to the science ofpsycho-
physics? It is claimed that its accessibility to ex-
periment gives it the proper exactness of a science,
and that the old psychology is a mere jumble of
verbal disputes. But the admirers of psychophys-
ics forget both their own admissions and the
ultimate court of appeal for their conclusions, as
well as the nature of the phenomena to be meas-
ured.
We have only to consult the above table to dis-
cover that only the stimuli are expressed in dis-
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tinct quantitative-relations. It is true that these
can be definitely measured, because they are ob-
jective quantities like all other commensurable
forces. But it is very different with the intensity
of sensation, although Weber and Fechner pre-
sumed to express its increase in an arithmetic
ratio, with the geometric ratio of stimulus. As a,
matter of fact, the sensation and is increase are not
measured in terms of the exciting cause: if they
were, something of scientific accuracy would be
given the results. But as it is, the only distinct
knowledgewe have whenthere is a definite increase
of excitation, is, that there is a perceptible change
in.the intensity of sensation. All mathematical
formulae to express one sensation in quantitative
relation to another are purely gratuitous:
whether one sensation is once, twice, or three
times as intense as another, no one can presume
to declare with mathematical definiteness,
because there is only a subjective criterion
for intensity of sensation, and such a criterion
affords no commensurating unit for others. This is
admitted by psychophysicists themselves in com-
plete unconsciousness of its significance against
the claims of mathematical and scientific accuracy
for psychology.
"Doubtless," says Mr. Ribot, an enthusiastic
defender of the new science, " our states of con-
sciousness are undetermined magnitudes. But is
it impossible to determine them, that is, to sub-
mit them to-measure? The essential condition
of measure is, that there be a fixed relation be-
tween the measure and that which is measured;i"
and he elsewhere observes that " there is no unit
or common measure to which we can refer two
sensations to determine their intensive magni-
tudes." A still more forcible statement and ad-
mission is the following:-
"We assert without hesitation that it is
brighter at mid-day than by moonlight; that the
firing of a cannon makes more noise than the
firing of a pistol. There is, then, a quantitative
comparison of sensations; but we can only say
there is equality or inequality, never how many
times one sensation is greater than another. Has
the sun a hundred or a thousand times more bril-
liancy than the moon? Does a cannon make a
hundred or a thousand times more noise than a pis-
tol ? It is impossible to answer this question. The
natural measure of sensation that each man pos-
sesses reveals to him the more, the less, the equal,
never the quantum. Our determinations are
always vague and approximate."
Such admissions should certainly modify the
pretensions of psychophysics to an accuracy not
claimed or possessed by the old psychology, and
they do prove fatal to the claim of any such ex-
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-actness as is enjoyed by the physical sciences.
The truth and importance of the law within the
-range of stimuili will not be denied; but as long
as it is a mere assumption for purposes of definite
expression that intensities of sensation are mathe-
matical multiples of each other, there will be no
reason for supposing one ratio rather than an-
other, and hence the law proves absolutely use-
less for determining any exactness in psychology.
In any case it could reach it only by the intro-
.spective method, which psychophysicists are so
disposed to disparage, and yet only a little reflec-
tion is required to observe that introspection in
.one of its phases is the only valid testimony to the
results already obtained and formulated. The
truth is, there is no intelligible reason for setting
up an opposition between introspection and experi-
ment in order to place psychophysics in the rank
of exact sciences. The question should not be as
to its exactness or mathematical expression, but it
should be the truth of its facts and conclusions.
Conformity with mathematical laws and expres-
sion is not the sole criterion of truth or science,
and hence by insinuating it the investigator but
declares the transient and ephemeral nature of his
speculations.
The problems and phenomena of psychic con-
-stants are much more interesting and important.
They are welcome also as giving much more defi-
niteness and intelligibility to some of the ques-
tions of transcendentalism, and, far from contra-
dicting it, they seem to confirm it. The illusions
producible in our conceptions of time and space
under various circumstances stimulated inquirers
to experiment for some constant in our various
space determinations, and to measure the dura-
tion of psychic phenomena, or the intervals be-
tween stimulus and sensation, in order to find
some constant for time. The time was when
these two data of intelligence were supposed to
be fixed and invariable, but further observations
show them exposed to all the illusions belonging
to perception in general, and hence the ques-
tion arose .both as to their origin and their
nature. Transcendental philosophy anticipated
experiment in making them ideal. but it was
more successful in talking about them than it
was in making its views clear and intelligible.
Experimental psychology has come in to furnish
us with definite data for reconsidering our empiri-
cal conceptions of them.
The nervous organization exhibits very differ-
ent susceptibilities in different parts of the body:
in some portions of the sensorium distinct and co-
existent sensations are more nearly related in
space than at others. In some cases it is also dif-
ficult to distinguish direction in the moving cause
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of sensation. Thus in different stages of maturity
and development, space relations vary in definite-
ness. The sensibility of different parts of the
body ha's been accurately measured and tabulated,
so as to show the different ranges of experience
in sensation. For the palm of the hand, the fin-
ger-tips, the back of the hand, the arms, the
shoulder-blade, the back, different parts of the
face, the soles of the feet, etc., sensibility varies,
both in respect to the threshold of sensation and
the determination of separate excitations. In
some cases there is only consciousness of affec-
tion, and no distinct knowledge of location. And
in the case of vision the illusions respecting
geometrical dimensions are indefinitely numer-
ous; so that serious doubt may be raised as to
the correctness of our ordinary spacial judgments,
and some other constant must be demanded for
theoretical purposes than is found in practical
experience.
Hence the problem has been to find whether
vision or muscular effort was the more accurate
in the determination of space. But experiment
has succeeded only in showing the corrective in-
fluence of one sense upon another without dis-
covering any fixed conception to serve as an in-
variable measure for space. And so with the ex-
perience of time. Innumerable experiments show
that our conception of duration can be varied
with all sorts of circumstances: sometimes it
appears indefinitely long, and at others incredibly
short, while other facts go to prove that there
was no difference in the two instances. Now
moments may seem an age, and again there seems
no interval of time between the beginning and
the end of hours. And again our conception of
time is influenced by the period required to realize
an event or experience: it may be lengthened or
shortened by the state of vitality, or the state of
attention and application. The time between
stimulus and sensation is different in different
individuals, and yet it cannot be determined by
subjective measurement; so that some other con-
stant must be assumed to prove variability in any
case. Hence there is a resort to heart-beats, or to
certain forms of rhythm, as the better representa-
tives of our definite conceptions for time, and
perhaps to certain forms of co-existence as
criteria for definable space. Thus space and time
do not appear as absolute and simple as supposed
in the older philosophy, but relative and complex,
at least in experience. Other mental phenomena
must be considered in our notion of them.
The attainment of such conclusions is due en-
tirely to the experimental method, which has
insisted upon actual demonstration of all specula-
tions regarding ultimate conceptions. This scien-
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tific spirit has-added new interest to a study which
was threatened with neglect, because it was too
content with mere assertion, and presumed upon
the self-evidence of words to communicate its wis-
dom. Although it may determine nothing as to
the quality of sensation and consciousness, it will
do much to drive away the m'ist that has ever
hovered over many psychological speculations.
Still experiments have not yet demonstrated the
derivative nature of time and space, although they
have gone far to make them a matter of intelligible
consideration and discussion. They have shown
the variability of ourempirical conceptions of them,
but have not destroyed their validity as postulates
of experience, because no special sense-perception
may be constant enough to supply a criterion of
their fixity. Indefinite conceptions of them at
least are always assumed. However we may seek
for some regular and uniform experiences within
the ken of consciousness to serve as constants for
them, or as the phenomena which determine and
represent our conceptions of them, we shall find by
closer scrutiny that some notion of time and space
is already postulated in the very phenomena sup-
posed to give the psychic constants for them; that
is, we shall in vain endeavor to go outside of time
and space to discover events which will account
for them, or present their genesis from non-spacial
and non-temporal relations. But at the same time
experiment is providing data to render them clearer
and more tangible to ordinary reflection than older
speculations. For space the theory of local signs,
both tactual and visual, is taking the place of tran-
scendental conceptions; and for time, the theory
of discontinuous states of consciousness that may
be objectively regular and uniform in their causes.
Among the most important contributions, how-
ever, which psychophysics has given to science,
are the results showing the differential functions
of the nervous system. The sense of temperature
has been shown to be as distinct from touch as
that is from vision, and even a different nerve is
required to perceive cold from that which per-
ceives heat. How far this differentiation of the
sensorium may be carried, no one can predict.
But even the established conclusions of the pres-
ent will exert a far-reaching influence upon psy-
chological speculations, and none more than the
fact that distinct nervous organisms are required
to receive representations once supposed to be con-
nected with the same sense. It is too soon to pre-
dict what influence it will have in modifying
older views: it will certainly modify them, but
there is -elways a truth, even in the past, that
avails to survive the mortality of language; and,
although psychophysics may compel us to recon-
struct some theories, it will not wholly do away
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with the intellectual conquests of history, or oblige
us to cast dust in the face of introspective methods,
merely to gratify and strengthen an unnecessary
prejudice against older opinions.
J. H. HYSLoP.
ANATOMICAL AND MEDICAL KNOWL-
EDGE OF ANCIENT EGYPT.
IN a paper read at a recent meeting ofthe Royal
institution of Great Britain, Prof. A. Macalister
gave an account of the ancient anatomical -and
medical knowledge of Egypt, of which the follow-
ing is a summary from the Lancet.
The surviving fragments of the early literature
of Egypt are mainly of a religious character; but
this is rot to be wondered at, for the genius of the
people was essentially religious, and their doctrine
of the future state leavened their national life in
almost every particular. To them the body was
an integral part of the immortal humanity: there-
fore it could not be permitted to turn to decay,
but had to be preserved from corruption that it
might be a fit receptacle for the soul to dwell in
through eternity. Their treatment of the body
was thus dependent on their belief of its relation
to the soul, and this, we learn from their religious
writings, was a relationship of eternal independ-
ence. To secure perpetual preservation, the body
had to be properly embalmed, the cavities opened
and subjected to the action of antiseptics.
Although the body was sacred, under the special
protection of the god Thoth, though each part was
under the guardianship of a special divinity, yet
this sacredness did not preclude careful inspection
and the processes necessary for preservation, for
aU parts had to be perpetuated.
Embalming was a religious rite, tobe performed
by the priests of the Cultus; and the historian
Herodotus has preserved for us what is doubtless
a substantially accurate account of the different
methods whereby it was done in the later times in
which he lived. The organs removed from the
bodies of persons of the better classes were not
retumed into the body, but were preserved in vases
of alabaster or stone, surmounted by the heads of
the four divinities of Hades, the sons of Horus
and Isis.
During the ascendency of Greek influence in
Egypt, Alexandria earned the reputation of being
the chief school of anatomy and medicine in the
world. Erasistratus, who lived in the days of
Ptolemy Soter, B.C. 285, was an anatomist of such
enthusiasm, thathe and his disciples received from
the king criminals condemned to death.
But this Alexandrian school, although upon
Egyptian soil, was essentially Greek in spirit
even Herophilus had learned some of his anatomy
